By Horncurrent | Analysis
January 2026
Khartoum / Sanaa — The return of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to Khartoum in January 2026 was neither a sudden battlefield reversal nor a victory driven solely by internal Sudanese dynamics. Rather, it marked the culmination of a long, externally enabled campaign—one that closely mirrors Saudi Arabia’s parallel strategy in Yemen. Viewed together, the two conflicts reveal a shared regional logic: Riyadh’s effort to reassert central state authority, marginalize UAE-backed sub-state actors, and reclaim strategic influence along the Red Sea corridor.
In Sudan, the SAF’s recovery began from a position of pronounced weakness. By mid-2024, the army was overstretched, facing acute manpower shortages and losing ground to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF’s decentralized structure and predatory control over territory delivered short-term battlefield gains, allowing it to outmaneuver conventional formations across much of the country.
The SAF’s counteroffensive, however, was not purely military. It unfolded as a political and social strategy aimed at rebuilding allegiance and restoring institutional authority. Central to this effort was the integration of allied forces previously outside the regular army—most notably the Darfur Joint Forces, a coalition of former rebel movements with deep familiarity of western and central Sudan. Their role proved decisive in holding El Fasher and disrupting RSF supply routes, preventing the group from consolidating full control over Darfur.
Concurrently, the SAF reactivated Islamist paramilitary units, including the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade. This move reflected pragmatism rather than ideology. At a moment of critical need, these units provided manpower, cohesion, and urban combat experience—assets essential to holding contested cities. The army also introduced a broad amnesty program for RSF defectors, reframing the conflict from a binary confrontation into a struggle over loyalty and legitimacy.
The strategy reached a turning point in October 2024 with the defection of Abu Aqla Kaikal, commander of the Sudan Shield Forces and one of the RSF’s most influential figures in central Sudan. Kaikal’s networks across al-Jazirah, Sennar, and the al-Butanah region had underpinned several RSF advances earlier in the war. His decision to switch sides shattered RSF momentum in the country’s center and sent a powerful signal that the balance of power was shifting.
That perception—of the SAF reemerging as the dominant force—triggered further local realignments. Tribal leaders, militias, and armed groups recalibrated their positions, accelerating the RSF’s political and territorial losses. By early 2026, these cumulative dynamics enabled the SAF’s return to Khartoum, restoring the symbolism and mechanics of central state authority.
Saudi Arabia’s role in this trajectory echoes its approach in Yemen, where Riyadh has consistently prioritized the reconstitution of state institutions over reliance on fragmented militias. In both theaters, the strategy seeks to curb the influence of UAE-backed sub-state actors while securing Red Sea routes critical to regional trade and security.
Together, Sudan and Yemen illustrate a broader Saudi recalibration—one focused on stabilizing allied states through centralized power rather than managing perpetual fragmentation. Whether this approach will deliver lasting stability remains uncertain, but its imprint on the region’s conflict dynamics is now unmistakable.
Source: Horn Review
